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INTRODUCTION 
 
“We had to watch the weather to keep us up-to-date.  
Harvey was slowly getting closer. All we could do was wait.  
The rain finally started falling. Huge waves began to crash.  
The coast of Texas was hit first, and then we were in its path.” 
- Landon Hayek, “They Called Him Harvey” 
The Aftermath 
 
 
 While I read Landon Hayek’s poetry book on Hurricane Harvey, I was reminded of the 
traumas that were experienced across not only the city of Houston but along the entire Texas 
Gulf Coast in the summer of 2017. Though he was only nine years old when he wrote “They 
Called Him Harvey,” Landon’s poem accurately portrays the emotions felt by millions before 
Harvey hit. His illustrated book maintains a cheerful tone, and the proceeds from the book 
benefit those affected by Hurricane Harvey. Still, sadness fell over me while I read, and my eyes 
watered.  
 The following summer was dominated by a feeling of angst. I was back home in Houston 
and was free from the responsibilities of college, but I could not overcome the fact that 
Hurricane Harvey was the third “500-year” flood in a span of three years. The National Weather 
Service assured us that “there [was] a 0.2 percent chance of having a flood of that magnitude 
[occur]” in any given year, yet we were seeing these disasters occur annually.1 To some extent, 
we could not trust the claims and suggestions made by experts and leaders because they had 
failed us before (i.e. the catastrophic failure to evacuate Houston when Hurricane Rita hit and the 
                                                     
1 US Department of Commerce, NOAA. “Flooding FAQ.” Accessed September 29, 2018. 
https://www.weather.gov/lot/floodingfaq. 
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failure to evacuate Houston when Harvey hit).2 Taking matters into our own hands, my family 
and I made a habit of carefully traversing the streets of Houston following a major flood. We 
were told by police to avoid walking on the streets since flooded potholes and sewer drains were 
invisible under the murky water. More drastic still were the unexpected changes in elevation 
throughout the city’s unorganized sprawl, which easily swept cars away in deeper waters. Even 
truck drivers were found perched on top of their enormous eighteen-wheelers as they waited for 
a boat or helicopter to save them from the flooded highways (Figure 1). Stories like these 
became commonplace. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) reported over 
6,500 highway water rescues and close to 122,331 people were rescued by local, state and 
federal first responders. Clearly, Houston and its inhabitants were dangerously unprepared for 
the “more than 19 trillion gallons of rainwater” that would inundate one-third of the city.3    
 
FIGURE 1: INTERSTATE HIGHWAY 45 APPEARS SUBMERGED BY OVER 34 INCHES OF RAIN BROUGHT FORTH BY 
HURRICANE HARVEY ON AUGUST 27, 2017. RICHARD CARSON / REUTERS 
                                                     
2Levin, Matt, “How Hurricane Rita Anxiety Led to the Worst Gridlock in Houston History - Houston Chronicle,” 
Houston Chronicle, August 25, 2017, https://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Hurricane-
Rita-anxiety-leads-to-hellish-fatal-6521994.php. 
3 FEMA, “Historic Disaster Response to Hurricane Harvey in Texas | FEMA.Gov,” September 22, 2017, 
https://www.fema.gov/news-release/2017/09/22/historic-disaster-response-hurricane-harvey-texas. 
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Hurricane Harvey undoubtedly scarred me, but the intensity of the experience is not what 
led me to write this thesis. For your average Houstonian, rain and occasional flooding is part of 
living in the Bayou City, especially during the wet summer seasons. There is no way around the 
fact that Houston’s humid subtropical climate attracts, on average, 50 inches of rain annually.4 
The very same amount of rain that bombarded Houston over the span of just three days during 
Harvey. Still, I decided to return home in the summer of 2018. My experiences that summer 
would ultimately lay the foundation for this thesis, for the Houston that welcomed me that 
summer donned the scars of the previous year. Empty plots of land were a grim reminder of the 
families that lost their homes, and the sudden spike in new construction and housing units hinted 
at a city desperately trying to rebuild. As homeowners throughout the region rebuilt their 
properties, displaced people also sought to rebuild their lives. Some moved away after deciding 
that the uncertainties of living in a place like Houston are too great to risk, but they were the 
minority. Because of Hurricane Harvey, over 42,000 Texans were housed in temporary shelters 
after nearly “80,000 homes [were flooded by] at least 18 inches of floodwater.” Of those homes, 
23,000 were inundated with more than 5 feet of floodwater.5 Fortunately, FEMA and flood 
insurance companies allowed a portion of the affected population to return to their damp and 
damaged homes after conducting preliminary quality assessments. Some people have not 
experienced that luxury, and now over 500 individuals live in tents under polluted highways.6 
Homelessness in Houston, like in any other American metropolis, has always been 
present. I have had personal encounters with homeless individuals in my neighborhood since I 
                                                     
4 rss Weather, “Climate in Houston, Texas,” accessed November 16, 2018, 
http://www.rssweather.com/climate/Texas/Houston/. 
5 FEMA, “Historic Disaster Response to Hurricane Harvey in Texas” 
6 The Coalition for the Homeless, “Local Data and Research | Coalition,” May 2018, 
http://www.homelesshouston.org/local-data-and-research/. 
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was young, and I helped lead my school’s chapter of Habitat for Humanity. Still, this post-
Harvey wave of homelessness felt different. A simple explanation for this increase would be that 
homes were damaged beyond repair, forcing those without any form of savings or aid to take 
their chances on the streets. This explanation is unsatisfactory and problematic because it 
diminishes the fault held by the institutions and systems put in place to protect us. The fact that 
lower-class and minority groups were disproportionately affected by Hurricane Harvey remains a 
strategically well-hidden reality, but this thesis aims to bring these realities to light. Through an 
exploration of Houston’s history as the energy capital of the U.S. and once one of the harshest 
Jim Crow cities in the country, I unravel the links between climate change, hurricanes, unequal 
housing practices, and homelessness. I argue that hurricanes have a disproportionately larger 
impact on minority groups, especially the lower class, and that their effects are largely rooted in 
racial inequalities and class divides. Only by recognizing these dynamics can we ever hope to 
rebuild and move forward, and as we have seen, little stands in the way of us and the next 
historic flood.  
Houston’s Flood History 
 
  
Increasing floods over the past decade are worthy of attention, but these are not isolated 
events or novel threats. Houston’s general disregard of urbanization and development, which 
plays a role in the city’s inability to handle heavy rainfall, has been a key feature of its history. In 
fact, floods, storms and the subtropical humid climate were actors in how Houston would 
initially develop. Early settlers and travelers showed a general distaste for the climate and 
aesthetic of the region. Frederick Law Olmsted, a popular American landscape architect who 
traveled through Houston in the 1850s, boldly remarked that Houston “is not a spot in which I 
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should prefer to come to light, burn, and expire; in fact, if the nether region…be a boggy 
country, the Avernal entrance might, I should think, with good possibilities, be looked for in this 
region.”7 Born and raised in Houston, I can attest to the accuracy of Olmsted’s claims--though 
the introduction of air-conditioning has surely helped. 
Prior to the rise of oil in the late-1800s as the dominant energy source, Houston and the 
Gulf Coast region were not promising locations for a thriving city. Heavy rainfall often flooded 
entire marshlands and made areas near regional rivers, streams, and bayous impassable. 
Furthermore, threats of hurricanes in the region “loomed for six months a year, from June to 
November, and the same months brought oppressive, debilitating heat and humidity.” For these 
reasons, Houston would remain sparsely populated until the turn of the 20th century. Until then, 
Houston would be an “island of urban opportunity in a sea of rural poverty.”8 Cotton plantations 
along the Brazos River would uphold the region’s economy until the 1900s, which of course 
meant a prevalence of slavery, peonage, and racial segregation. Clearly unfit for human 
settlement, Houston’s climate brought forth yellow fever and malaria epidemics by providing 
ideal conditions for mosquito vectors to procreate. Environmental historians, like J.R. McNeill, 
often link human-environment relationships using unexpected actors like disease, natural 
disasters, geography, specific plant and animal species, etc.9 Employing this framework, I argue 
that the environment plays a prominent role in shaping human experience, but humans 
themselves interact with each other and the environment in ways that perpetuate or exacerbate 
disasters, such as hurricanes and wildfires.  
                                                     
7 Olmsted, Frederick L., A Journey through Texas, or, a Saddle Trip on the Southwestern Frontier (New York: Dix, 
Edwards, 1857), 36 
8 Melosi, Martin V. and Pratt, Joseph, Energy Metropolis: An Environmental History of Houston and the Gulf Coast, 
History of the Urban Environment (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007). 21. 
9 McNeill, John R., Mosquito Empires : Ecology and War in the Greater Caribbean, 1620-1914, New Approaches to 
the Americas (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 
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For Houstonians, the promise of prosperity through the development of the land was far 
more important than its effects on the environment around them. Houston was notorious for its 
unwelcoming terrain, yet early settlers still decided to further alter the region. Relying on cotton 
as a cash crop commodity, Houston was eager to connect its cotton production with markets in 
the northeast. To achieve this, the city government and commercial interests designated the 
widening and deepening of existing bayous across the eastern part of the city to establish the 
Houston Ship Channel. This same ship channel today handles more than 80 million tons of 
shipping annually. 10 The economic gain associated with the ship channel, urbanization, and 
population growth propelled the city forward while altering the region’s watershed in 
unprecedented ways. What once was a city of slightly over 2,000 people would become an 
energy hub of over 80,000 in just two decades. As energy use increased throughout the 1900s, so 
did Houston’s population. In a relative blink of an eye, over 2.3 million people would end up in 
the fourth largest city in America.11  
 Catastrophic floods have plagued the Texas coast since the earliest recorded settlements, 
but their frequency, intensity, and impact have increased due to climate change and rapid 
urbanization. This is worrying because city officials have been slow in taking note of flooding. 
The earliest measures taken against deluge were in 1937, when the Harris County Flood Control 
District (HCFCD) was established. 12 Up until the late ‘90s, HCFCD was successful in keeping 
the city’s many bayous from inundating Downtown Houston with the help of the Addicks and 
Barker reservoirs (Fig. 2). Houstonians and officials alike took little notice of flooding events 
                                                     
10 Britannica, “Houston | Geography, History, & Points of Interest | Britannica.Com,” September 20, 2018, 
https://www.britannica.com/place/Houston. 
11 Texas State Historical Association, “Texas Almanac: City Population History from 1850-2000,” 2018. 
12 Thompson, Daphne. "Houston's History of Floods." A Brief History of Weather Radar. August 30, 2017. Accessed 
October 03, 2018. https://blog.weatherops.com/houstons-history-of-floods. 
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because they were generally mild. That changed in the summer of 2001, when Hurricane 
Allison’s rains and winds ripped through the city, killing 23 people and damaging 70,000 homes 
and more than 95,000 vehicles.13 Still, few measures had been taken against flooding other than 
rebuilding structures that had been damaged by water. This is evident in the amount of money 
that has been allocated towards hurricane relief and mitigation in the past. Hurricanes Rita and 
Ike cost Houston less than $20 billion total where Harvey’s costs have amounted to over $70 
billion plus over $30 billion for proposed projects throughout the city. This is why I feel that 
Hurricane Harvey is different. 
FEMA reported that over 300,000 houses were affected by Harvey’s 27 trillion gallons of 
rain, and total losses across the region exceed $75 billion. 14 Surely a lot can be said about the 
traumas experienced by those in the path of the hurricane, but an undeniable fact remains: not 
everyone continues to be haunted by what Harvey did to the city. As I have highlighted, poor and 
minority groups were and continue to be disproportionally affected by the damages caused by 
Hurricane Harvey. They are the ones that continue to camp out in crowded underpasses, and they 
are the ones that are most exposed to the injustices of climate change.  
To summarize a few key points, I would like to point to an idea introduced by Brian 
Black in his book, Petrolia: The Landscape of America’s First Oil Boom. He states that the rise 
of the oil industry in Houston marked the beginning of a “culture of massive disturbance” across 
the country; ultimately, these “massive [disturbances]” would render the region much more 
susceptible to the effects of climate change, more specifically, hurricanes and floods.15 Several 
factors have exacerbated the dangers associated with hurricanes. I argue that, when discussing 
                                                     
13 Thompson, Daphne. "Houston's History of Floods." 
14 FEMA, “Historic Disaster Response to Hurricane Harvey in Texas”. 
15 Black, Brian, Petrolia : The Landscape of America’s First Oil Boom, 1 online resource (xii, 235 pages) : illustrations, 
maps. vols., Creating the North American Landscape (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), 
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the effects of natural disasters on communities, social and power structures should be at the 
forefront of the conversation because these dynamics have shaped and continue to shape the 
relationships between humans, their environment, and disasters. This thesis aims to unravel the 
role of society in the ways hurricanes impact humans. Again, I quote historian J. R. McNeill 
when he states that “humankind and nature make their own history together, but neither can 
make it as they please.”16 With this in mind, I highlight the development of Houston, TX in 
relation to minority communities and floodplains. My aspiration with this approach is to 
highlight the relationships between the areas around Houston that are most susceptible to 
flooding and their demographics.   
I employ an interdisciplinary approach throughout this thesis to convince the reader that 
human nature and society are central to discussions of disasters and climate change. Chapter 1 
introduces the ecology and behavior of hurricanes, from the propagation of atmospheric waves 
over the continent of Africa to the conditions that allow this initial wave to become a full-fledged 
tropical cyclone. By listing the conditions necessary for a hurricane to form, I demonstrate how 
the overarching effects of anthropogenic climate change can increase the severity and frequency 
of hurricanes around the globe. Chapter 2 dives into the distribution of black and poor 
populations across Houston. This chapter aims to introduce the systematic and institutional 
powers responsible for the layout of the city, specifically highlighting Houston’s history as one 
of the most segregated Jim Crow cities in history. Topics in chapter 2 include unequal housing 
practices, instances of environmental racism, and the precursors leading to modern day Houston. 
Chapter 3 will explore Hurricane Harvey’s impact on the local homeless population. 
Furthermore, this chapter highlights the inequalities and faults associated with the aid provided 
                                                     
16 McNeill, John R. Mosquito Empires: 6 
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by federal and state agencies by pointing out class-divides along who receives aid to rebuild after 
a disaster. Finally, chapter 4 directs us to modern-day Houston and allows us to look towards the 
future of the Bayou City. Local, state, and federal project proposals are described, compared, and 
critiqued in this chapter. 
My goal in writing this thesis is to point out the inherent inequalities associated with 
hurricanes, and to a larger extent climate change. I aim to remind the reader that nature is deeply 
interwoven into the fabric of human society, and though it may be that we have little control over 
the immediate effects of natural disasters, we do have complete control over how we respond to 
these challenges. In this way, Hurricane Harvey identified every last chink in our armor. Now, if 
we fail to learn from our past mistakes, nobody else is to blame but ourselves.  
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CHAPTER 1  
 
 “That so many of us are here today is a recognition that the threat from climate 
change is serious, it is urgent, and it is growing. Our generation’s response to this 
challenge will be judged by history…No nation, however large or small, wealthy or 
poor, can escape the impact of climate change. Rising sea levels threaten every 
coastline. More powerful storms and floods threaten every continent.” 
-Barack Obama, UN Climate Change Summit (2009) 
Climate Change is the Culprit 
 
With urgency, former U.S. President Barack Obama relayed his concerns about climate 
change to representatives of over 90 nations gathered at the 2009 United Nations Climate 
Change Summit. Mr. Obama’s words were a chilling reminder that climate change is among us. 
Echoing the former president’s concerns, reputable scientific studies around the globe have 
pointed towards increases in atmospheric carbon from humans altering land-use patterns and 
burning fossil fuels. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change released a report towards 
the end of 2018 stating that humans only have until the year 2030 to curb climate change.17 If 
humans decrease carbon emissions significantly, then the IPCC suggests that “our world will 
suffer fewer negative impacts on intensity and frequency of extreme events.” In the most general 
sense, climate change, in particular global warming, is causing a range of environmental 
disasters, such as drought, sea-level rise, species extinction, and in our case, severe floods and 
hurricanes. Even if one were to argue that these trends are not linked to climate change, the 
increasing quantity and intensity of hurricanes across the globe every year is enough to warrant 
                                                     
17 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Summary for Policymakers of IPCC Special Report on Global 
Warming of 1.5ºC Approved by Governments.Report. October 8, 2018. Accessed October 20, 2018. 
https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/session48/pr_181008_P48_spm_en.pdf.  
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fear. This chapter links climate change to hurricanes using nonrenewable energy as the bridge 
between them. By framing climate change around energy consumption, I pinpoint how 
hurricanes have increased in frequency and intensity in response to human activities. 
What is a Hurricane? 
 
 
Hurricanes are defined as “rotating, organized systems of clouds and thunderstorms that 
originate over tropical or subtropical waters and have closed, low-level circulation”- hence their 
formal name, tropical cyclones. Typically, storms, tropical depressions, tropical storms, and 
hurricanes are differentiated primarily by their wind speed and wind patterns. Simply put, a 
common storm graduates into a tropical storm when maximum wind speeds reach 39 mph, and 
once a tropical storm’s maximum wind speeds reach 74 mph or higher, then the storm is 
classified a hurricane.18  
Once a storm becomes a hurricane, life-threatening injuries and damage to infrastructure 
become more apparent. Therefore, a classification system was developed to discriminate 
between hurricanes of different intensities. This classification system is called the Saffir-
Simpson scale, and it was developed in 1971 by civil engineer Herbert Saffir and meteorologist 
Robert Simpson after concluding that reliable ways to categorize and describe the damage 
caused by hurricanes were lacking in depth.19 Table 1 lists the different wind speeds associated 
with the different Saffir-Simpson scale categories as well as the type of damage expected from 
each category. Hurricane Harvey was a category 4 hurricane, but it brought with it a level of 
                                                     
18 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration US Department of Commerce, “What Is the Difference 
between a Hurricane and a Typhoon?,” accessed November 17, 2018, 
https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/cyclone.html. 
19 Lacovelli, Debi, “The Saffir/Simpson Hurricane Scale: An Interview with Dr. Robert Simpson,” accessed November 
17, 2018, https://novalynx.com/store/pc/Simpson-Interview-d53.htm. 
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damage no one could have ever anticipated. Historically, hurricanes are most common in this 
region of the world between the months of June and November. This window of time is officially 
called a region’s Hurricane Season.20 Hurricane researchers include members of NASA, the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and the National Weather Service 
(NWS). Aircrafts, buoys, and satellites are used by these groups to determine wind speeds, wind 
patterns, and ocean and atmospheric temperatures during a hurricane. When combined, the data 
gathered by these tools allow experts to classify and categorize hurricanes.21  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
20 NOAA, “What Is the Difference between a Hurricane and a Typhoon?” 
21 Whetzel, Joan, “Tools Used to Measure Hurricanes | Sciencing,” March 13, 2018, https://sciencing.com/tools-
used-measure-hurricanes-6862094.html. 
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TABLE 1: HURRICANE CATEGORIES AS DESCRIBED BY THE SAFFIR-SIMPSON SCALE / NATIONAL HURRICANE CENTER  
Category Sustained Winds (mph) Types of Damage 
Tropical 
Depression 
≤ 38 Light flooding and potential power outages 
Tropical 
Storm  
39-73 Higher potential for flooding, power outages more 
common, and light infrastructure damage 
1 74-95 Roof and shingle damage, large branches will snap, and 
extensive damage to power lines is likely 
2 96-110 Major roof and home siding damage, uprooted trees will 
block roads, and power loss is expected to last from days 
to weeks 
3 111-129 Removal of roof decking, blocked roads due to snapped 
trees, electricity and water will be unavailable for several 
days or weeks 
4 130-156 Major damage or loss of roof and walls, most trees and 
poles will be downed, power outage likely to last many 
weeks and area may be uninhabitable 
5 157 ≤ Framed homes destroyed, total roof and wall failure, 
power outages, and area will be uninhabitable for weeks 
or months 
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Hurricane Ecology 
 
 
Hurricanes are unique to areas that have a surplus of warm coastal waters. For this 
reason, hurricanes form within 25° of the Equator because this is where warm, tropical waters 
are found. Furthermore, hurricane activity “generally occurs over the oceans in regions where 
sea surface temperatures (SST) exceed 26° C (~78° F).”22 As expected, an increase in global 
temperatures has been met with an equally significant increase in SST.  
Hurricanes commonly develop catastrophically high wind speeds capable of tumbling 
structures and mobilizing ocean waves (i.e. coastal storm surge). This occurs while the hurricane 
simultaneously accumulates millions of gallons of water, which will be deposited onto inland 
environments- both urban and natural. Hurricanes are notorious for their beautiful spiral shape, 
but this shape plays a major role in the ferocity and speed of a hurricane (Fig. 2).  
 
FIGURE 2. ON AUG. 30 AT 3:20 P.M. EDT NASA’S AQUA SATELLITE CAPTURED A VISIBLE LIGHT IMAGE OF TROPICAL STORM HARVEY MOVING 
NORTH OVER TEXAS AND LOUISIANA. THE EYE OF THE STORM IS VISIBLE NEAR THE SOUTH COAST OF LOUISIANA / NASA GODDARD MODIS 
RAPID RESPONSE 
 
                                                     
22 Hart, Dr. Robert. Hurricanes: A Primer on Formation, Structure, Intensity Change and Frequency, 20. 2 
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The spiral shape of a hurricane is a visual representation of the intense wind speeds it 
exhibits. A hurricane’s winds rotate and interact with the eye of the storm, which is located in the 
center of the system. To achieve this spiral formation, a storm typically requires a small, closed 
circulation system with higher temperatures than normal. In this case, these warmer temperatures 
are usually supplied by the Gulf of Mexico’s steady supply of active thunderstorms throughout 
the summer. With a considerable concentration of thunderstorms near the center, a storm can 
develop into a tropical storm and ultimately, into a full-fledged hurricane (Figure 3). This 
transformation relies on heat collecting in the center of the circulation. The Earth’s rotation on its 
axis also interacts with these events to fully realize the spiral shape we rely on to detect 
hurricanes. The accumulation of precipitation inside the growing system lowers the surface 
pressure of the hurricane. This compression of the system strengthens the circulating winds while 
diverting pressure throughout the hurricane. The difference in pressure throughout the system 
causes wind to rush inward towards the eye of the storm, and as the storm increases in size, it 
becomes easier for it to grow because the eye of the hurricane promotes evaporation and 
accelerates wind speeds. Consequently, the system can only be slowed or weakened by the 
sudden absence of warm water and heat.23 
                                                     
23 Hart, Dr. Robert. “Hurricanes: A Primer on Formation…” 
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FIGURE 3. A TRANSECT OF A HURRICANE. THE SMALL RED ARROWS SHOW WARM, MOIST AIR RISING FROM THE OCEAN’S SURFACE, AND 
FORMING CLOUDS IN BANDS AROUND THE EYE OF THE STORM. THE BLUE ARROWS SHOW COOL, DRY AIR SINKING INTO THE EYE OF THE 
STORM BETWEEN THE BANDS. / NASA 
 
Political Ecology of Hurricanes  
 
 
Hurricanes can be described in terms of their political ecology. Political ecology in this 
sense refers to the relationship between nature and society, specifically the political and 
economic aspects of society. As previously noted, even the changes we are seeing in global 
temperatures can be linked to humans. Furthermore, hurricanes traverse and affect landscapes 
across diverse political regions, and their very origin can be traced to locations near and far. For 
instance, the formation of tropical cyclones in the Atlantic Ocean is commonly attributed to an 
atmospheric wave that originates in northern Africa.24 This atmospheric wave, called an easterly 
wave, travels over and across the Atlantic Ocean until sufficiently warm waters feed into it and 
create hurricanes via the processes mentioned above. Since weather patterns halfway across the 
world are causing devastation halfway across the world, clearly, there must be a cooperation 
across parties. The following paragraphs will support this claim by listing and describing how 
                                                     
24 Hart, Dr. Robert. “Hurricanes: A Primer on Formation…” 
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humans across the world are at fault for altering global climate patterns. To achieve this, I will 
turn back to Houston’s history as the “energy capital of America.”25  
 Houston, like many other cities across the United States, experienced unprecedented 
growth following the discovery of oil in the late 1800s and its production as the main 
nonrenewable energy source for the country by the mid-20th century.26 The environmental 
degradation that would arise from the processing and manufacturing of oil and petroleum 
products would surpass that of coal. Like coal and natural gas, oil is formed through a process 
spanning millions of years. For oil to form, dead plants and animals are compressed and 
chemically altered under many layers of sediment. Rather than being decomposed by fungi and 
microbes, the biomatter is stored and compressed underground, where the carbon that would 
have been released by decomposers remains locked away until humans retrieve it. Once humans 
utilize fossil fuels, the carbon that should have been sequestered in underground sinks is released 
into the atmosphere, which becomes saturated with much more carbon than normal.  
 Fossil fuels have been singled out as a leading cause of climate change because of the 
heavy land-use change associated with retrieving the resource as well as the energy required to 
process and refine a product that is inefficient in its energy output. The main argument against 
fossil fuels is that they require too much energy to retrieve, process, and utilize as well as that 
they produce dangerous quantities of carbon that are reintroduced and stored in the atmosphere. 
Not only that, but the energy that is used to transport, process, and refine these fossil fuels also 
release carbon in the process. Carbon is not inherently dangerous. The problem arises when too 
much of it is expelled into the atmosphere over a sustained period of time as there is no feasible 
way to rid the atmosphere of it. Spikes in atmospheric carbon are dangerous because carbon 
                                                     
25 Melosi & Pratt. Energy Metropolis. 3 
26 Melosi & Pratt. Energy Metropolis. 4 
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behaves as a greenhouse gas. That is, certain volatile compounds, such as carbon, methane, and 
water vapor, interact with the sun’s rays as they penetrate Earth’s atmosphere. Rather than 
allowing the sun’s infrared beams to exit the Earth’s atmosphere, these greenhouse gases absorb 
and react with the beams, resulting in a considerable release of heat energy that remains trapped 
in our planet. To make matters worse, increases in atmospheric carbon causes a positive 
feedback from water vapor as trapped heat cause more water to evaporate into the atmosphere. 
This process further traps heat as water vapor reacts with infrared light. Burning fossil fuels is 
clearly shifting the balance of our atmosphere in complicated ways, but one thing remains clear: 
rising global temperatures are warming global surface waters, which creates the perfect 
conditions for powerful hurricanes to form. Humans have already altered the Earth’s climate in 
significant ways; it is now up to us to attempt to reverse the mistakes we have made. After all, 
IPCC claims we have 12 more years to do so.  
  
 
 
   
   
 
  
  
   
 
 
19 
 
CHAPTER 2  
 
“The United States is no longer a biracial society of blacks and whites exclusively. 
But even though the browning of the nation-rapid growth in Hispanic 
populations- is changing the racial relations landscape, black-white disparities are 
for the most part still the greatest of all racial challenges in the country.” 
– Robert D. Bullard, The Black Metropolis in the 21st Century  
Demographics and Environmental Racism 
 
 
 Described as an “archetypal twentieth-century city,” Houston is a “multimodal, 
decentralized, and expansive metropolis” known for its energy industry and “consummate 
suburban society.” Initially a heavily industrial “freeway city,” Houston has undergone many 
changes as the city’s population and diversity have increased. More important still, the 
unrelenting commitment to economic growth has riddled the booming metropolis with dangerous 
ozone production, the presence of over a dozen Superfund sites throughout the region, water 
pollution, and uncontrolled flooding events. Though these problems are surely of concern to 
those living in the city, environmental issues often impact minority groups and people of color, 
specifically low-income minority groups, much more frequently and to a much higher degree 
compared to white and affluent people. This chapter aims to describe the distribution of black 
communities across Houston as established by racist housing practices throughout the 1900s. By 
exploring Houston’s history of Jim Crow laws, I map out the existing watershed onto segregated 
communities throughout the city.27  
 Unlike many American megacities, Houston is characterized by its obvious lack of 
zoning laws, which has contributed to the general chaos associated with how the city expanded. 
                                                     
27 Melosi & Pratt. Energy Metropolis: 105 
 
 
20 
 
The lack of a zoning ordinance in Houston means that structures can be erected anywhere in the 
city regardless of purpose or geography. Though generally unplanned, downtown Houston still 
remains the focal point of the Gulf Coast. A general understanding of the layout of Houston will 
aid when I describe the demographics of the city (Figure 4).  
 
FIGURE 4. A MAP OF HOUSTON, TX DEPICTING THE MAJOR HIGHWAY SYSTEMS IN YELLOW. DOWNTOWN HOUSTON LIES AT THE CENTER 
AND IS OUTLINED BY HIGHWAY 610. BODIES OF WATER ARE MORE PROMINENT ON THE EASTERN SIDE OF THE CITY, WHICH IS NEARER TO 
THE COAST. 
 
 Robert D. Bullard, deemed the “Father of Environmental Justice” and revered as a 
scholar of black politics in the South, states in his book entitled The Black Metropolis in the 
Twenty-First Century: Race, Power, and Politics of Place that “race and class are still underlying 
factors that explain the sociospatial layout of most of our cities, suburbs, and metropolitan 
regions, including quality of schools, location of job centers, housing patterns, environmental 
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quality, commercial and business development, access to health care, and a host of other quality-
of-life indicators for African Americans.”28  
Historically, a majority of black and poor populations in Houston have been located 
within the confines of the “south-central and southeast portions of the city into northeast and 
north-central Houston.” Black communities can now be found across the northwest and 
southwestern parts of the city, but many of the impoverished neighborhoods remain unchanged 
(Figure 5). African-Americans now make up one-fourth of the city of Houston and have spread 
across most parts of the city, but their history remains rooted in class divides.  
Segregation in Houston dates back to the birth of the energy sector at the turn of the 
century. Conservative rural populations from west Texas and Louisiana migrated into Houston 
with hopes of reaping the benefits of the energy sector, and they enforced the segregation and 
oppression from which the city was built on. Nonetheless, by 1950 black communities 
throughout Houston had become well established and were on the rise. The largest concentration 
of black individuals was located in “three major segregated neighborhoods- the Fourth Ward, 
Third Ward, and Fifth Ward” (Figure 5).  These three wards are the focus of this section because 
they have historically been inhabited by mostly African-American families, and they are 
considered low-income communities. Furthermore, these areas have historically experienced 
higher levels of flooding as well as unwarranted proximity to refineries, factories, and other 
heavily polluting industries. In this case, racism uses a seemingly invisible hand to map out the 
landscape.29 
                                                     
28Bullard, Robert D. The Black Metropolis in the Twenty-First Century: Race, Power, and Politics of Place. Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007: 1 
29 Melosi & Pratt. Energy Metropolis: 207 
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FIGURE 5. THE 2017 U.S. CENSUS SHOWS THE DISTRIBUTION OF DIFFERENT ETHNIC GROUPS ACROSS THE CITY. BLACK COMMUNITIES ARE 
DEPICTED BY THE RED COLOR AND ARE PREDOMINANTLY IN THE SOUTHERN AND EASTERN PARTS OF THE CITY. 
Unfair Housing Practices  
 
Many people tend to associate racial segregation with private practices or individual 
preferences. That is, it is believed that when people of color move into neighborhoods there is a 
“white flight” that is followed by an even bigger influx of minority groups into the area. This 
more cultural and less nuanced explanation for racial segregation is often referred to as “de facto 
segregation” because it hints at its inevitability.30 This explanation, though prevalent, has been 
refuted and debunked time and time again by passionate environmentalists, historians, and policy 
experts. Though some elements of de facto segregation may hold truth, such as the initial 
prejudice held by whites when minorities settle into new areas, the real fault lies with institutions 
                                                     
30 Rothstein, Richard. The Color of Law: A Forgotten History of How Our Government Segregated America. Liveright 
Publishing Corporation, a Division of W.W. Norton & Company, 2018. vii 
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that normalize the systematic oppression of blacks and poor people. Richard Rothstein, an expert 
of Jim Crow laws and racial segregation in US housing practices, introduces “what courts call de 
jure: segregation by law and public policy.” This more dangerous and malicious type of 
segregation was possible through the “purposeful use of public housing by federal and local 
governments” following the Great Depression, the development of insurance policies that 
subjugated African-American applicants to unfair home prices, and by outright denying minority 
groups from moving into areas that were historically white or already “integrated enough.” Not 
only were people of color systematically wrangled into certain neighborhoods, they were also 
forced to endure quickly deteriorating infrastructure to repel white and/or wealthier individuals. 
Slightly more obvious have been the operations to locate factories, landfills and other unwanted 
facilities near poor and minority neighborhoods. Furthermore, blue-collar workers have also 
settled in areas surrounding these factories, which has increased the proportion of low-income 
individuals in these neighborhoods. Over time, these neighborhoods would urbanize and reach a 
much higher level of flood risk than before.31  
 A common misconception associated with de facto segregation is that black families have 
been unable to move into predominantly white middle-class communities and are still unable to 
do so merely because they lack the means. In this case, segregation is just another marker of their 
own status. On the surface, this may seem like a valid argument, but it takes a deeper 
understanding of income gaps between low and middle-income groups to fully understand how 
thoroughly racism is embedded in housing segregation. Some people are able escape poverty 
through strenuous work, dedication, and to some extent luck and timing, but unfortunately, this 
tends to be a small percentage of low-income individuals. Though it may be easy to just blame 
                                                     
31 Rothstein, Richard. The Color of Law  
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someone for not working hard enough or for not wanting to better for themselves, the truth is that 
predominantly black and poor neighborhoods have been molded and built over the foundations 
established by class and racial divides in the twentieth century. 
 In Houston and around the country, black communities have historically been considered 
“opportunity-poor” communities because of the fact that “businesses systematically avoid 
African-American areas of all class levels and selectively target white areas for their operations.” 
Furthermore, there are many recorded instances of banks giving credit extensions on unfair terms 
for people living in specific geographic areas or denying mostly black communities equal access 
to residential, consumer, and small business credit. What these unfair practices end up doing is 
creating poor, working class, or minority neighborhoods with fewer choices and opportunities, 
such as affordable housing, good-quality schools, high-paying jobs, businesses, green spaces, 
parks and even hospitals and police stations.32  
We then come back to the question of income gaps, and the ability of low-income 
communities to pull themselves out of poverty. Given that black neighborhoods are 
disproportionately less likely to have successful businesses or equal opportunities, it has been 
observed that these individuals tend to have “smaller disposable incomes and fewer saving” 
which keeps these families from accumulating wealth and moving into middle-class 
communities in the long run.33 Banks and insurance companies are still guided by their 
predecessors to this day, though perhaps in less obvious ways, and poor and minority groups 
continue to have a hard time moving into lower-risk neighborhoods. Unfair housing and zoning 
practices have rendered minority groups vulnerable to disasters, specifically the flooding 
                                                     
32 Bullard, Robert D. The Black Metropolis in the Twenty-First Century: 2 
33 Rothstein, Richard. The Color of Law: 154 
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associated with hurricanes. The following section will map out Houston’s most vulnerable 
locations in relation to the racial and class groups inhabiting these areas.  
Minorities in the Floodplains  
 
 
Following Hurricane Rita, a category 5 hurricane that made landfall in Houston on 
September, 2005 and caused over a hundred fatalities as well as over $18 million in damages, the 
city of Houston’s Harris County Flood Control District created an online educational mapping 
tool using data obtained and updated by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).34 
This online tool, named the Flood Insurance Rate Map (FIRM), can be used to locate 
floodplains, which will be useful in our analysis of demographics across the city. This 
relationship is clearly summarized in figure 6.  
Mapped onto the Flood Education Mapping Tool are nine of the most dangerous and 
most impoverished neighborhoods in Houston according to the U.S. census. The average income 
across these neighborhoods ranges from $12,477 to slightly above $50,000 in the wealthier 
locations, which is still $5,000 below the average income in Harris County.35 Just by looking at 
average yearly income, school quality rankings, and crime rates in these locations, we see a 
definite trend between demographics and flood-risk. Furthermore, the nine sites labeled in figure 
6 are predominantly African-American or Latinx, except for Midtown (site 3) and Meyerland 
(site 7) which are experiencing increasing gentrification. Clearly, a large portion of Houston runs 
the risk of encountering floods, but historically, the wealthiest neighborhoods that are also near 
                                                     
34 “Harris County Flood Education Mapping Tool” Harris County Flood Education Mapping Tool. Accessed 
November 5, 2018. http://www.harriscountyfemt.org/. 
35 U.S. Census Bureau, “US Census Bureau QuickFacts: Houston City, Texas,” 2018, 
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/map/harriscountytexas,houstoncitytexas#viewtop. 
 
 
26 
 
floodplains have experienced little infrastructural damage due to more sophisticated drainage 
systems paid for by more abundant public tax dollars. Areas marked by the green boxes are 
among the wealthiest neighborhoods in Houston, and they definitely keep themselves elevated 
and distant from the 100-year floodplains, which are marked by the darker blue colors in figure 
6.  
 
FIGURE 6. POOREST NEIGHBORHOODS IN RED 1=SECOND WARD; 2=MIDTOWN; 3=NORTHLINE; 4=THIRD WARD; 5=EASTWOOD; 
6=NORTHSIDE VILLAGE, 7=MEYERLAND, 8=KASHMERE GARDENS; 9=GALENA PARK.  
WEALTHIEST NEIGHBORHOODS IN GREEN A= HUNTER’S CREEK VILLAGE; B=WEST UNIVERSITY PLACE: C=RIVER OAKS: D=MONTROSE: 
E=BELLAIRE; F= THE HEIGHTS; G= CRESTWOOD)/ HARRIS COUNTY FLOOD EDUCATION MAPPING TOOL 
 
Houston’s current struggle with the effects of climate change and hurricanes is deeply 
embedded within the racial and class divides that have tortured the city since its establishment in 
the mid-1800s. Through an exploration of racist housing practices in the growth of Houston, one 
can conclude that segregation during this time served a very real purpose. The first suburb of the 
city, marked by the letter F, was the Houston Heights. With seven historic districts, the Heights 
was founded in 1896 by Oscar Martin Carter and Daniel Denton Cooley, members of the Omaha 
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and South Texas Land Company.36 As one could have guessed, the men were drawn to this 
location because it was near downtown yet had a significant rise in elevation, which would keep 
both floods and mosquitoes at bay. From the very beginning of development in Houston, we see 
the most appealing and safest location become inhabited by the privileged. Wanting to maintain 
their properties’ value and their families safe, members of the higher class had the resources 
necessary to build the city in their image. This is exactly why Houston’s Historic District 
predominantly lies in The Heights, Montrose (green D), and West University Place (green B), 
three of the wealthiest and most elevated neighborhoods in Houston (Fig. 6). Recognizing the 
dangers of developing in low elevations, Downtown Houston stands about 50 feet above sea 
level, which is only 40 feet below the highest elevation in the city.37 
 Diversity began to rise throughout the 1900s due to the boom in the energy sector and 
the decline in cotton production due to its mechanization. Thus, older neighborhoods that were 
already fully developed, such as the three mentioned above, were out of reach for incoming 
minorities. Originating from the slave plantation economy, Houston has been plagued by 
prejudice and racism since its infancy, and these factors remained an integral part in the growth 
of Houston under Jim Crow laws in the second-half of the 20th century. I conclude that 
Houston’s very first neighborhoods were opportunistically chosen by white elite in the most 
elevated locations to avoid disease and property damage, and by developing these locations, they 
laid the foundation for the segregation of future populations into unappealing and dangerous 
floodplains.  
 
  
                                                     
36 Guillen, Darla, “How the Heights Became the Heights - Houston Chronicle,” September 11, 2017, 
https://www.chron.com/neighborhood/heights/article/How-the-Heights-became-the-Heights-10443862.php. 
37 “Topographic Map Houston,” topographic-map.com, accessed November 17, 2018, http://en-us.topographic-
map.com/places/Houston-6818619/. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
“How often have I lain beneath rain on a stranger roof, thinking of 
home” 
-William C. Faulkner, “As I Lay Dying” 
Tent-Cities in the Underpass  
  
Clusters of homeless people have appeared throughout the City of Houston following 
Hurricane Harvey. What were once uninhabited underpasses have become the living quarters for 
hundreds of Houstonians. The rise in homelessness across the city is painfully evident. A simple 
explanation for the rise of homelessness in Houston may be that there was absolutely nothing 
anybody could do about the torrential rainfall once Harvey made landfall. In reality, the Gulf 
Coast is no stranger to hurricanes, and the fact that the region was built on flat prairies, marshes, 
and coastal ecosystems does not help. Still, ecology and geography alone are not to blame for the 
sudden spike in the number of displaced Houstonians. In this chapter, I argue that government 
agencies failed to help citizens rebuild after Harvey in part because the magnitude of the 
devastation was unprecedented but also because flood insurance via the National Flood 
Insurance Program (NFIP) and aid from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
were unavailable or insufficient for low-income communities.38  
 Hurricane Harvey rattled neighborhoods across Houston that had never experienced 
flooding before. In totality, Harvey unleashed an astounding 50 inches of rain in a span of just 
three days—slightly above the annual average rainfall in the region. Houston was not ready to 
                                                     
38 Despart, Zach. "Flood Insurance Paid Homeowners $100,000 More than FEMA after Harvey, Expert Says." 
HoustonChronicle.com. June 07, 2018. Accessed November 15, 2018. 
https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Harris-County-homeowners-without-
flood-insurance-12973727.php. 
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withstand the devastation, but more importantly, homeowners were far less prepared to rebuild 
afterwards. Simply put, Hurricane Harvey taught Houstonians just how complicated the effects 
of natural disasters can be on a heavily urbanized metropolitan city like Houston.  
When discussing the nature of aid, specifically for a flood event, it is important to take 
into consideration the following potential sources of aid: private insurance companies, the 
National Flood Insurance Program (NIFP), the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA), and small-scale local and federal aid. Of these sources, private flood insurance policies 
are largely employed by large-scale companies because of how expensive, yet expansive, the 
coverage is. In a similar note, federal aid has been distributed intermittently as problems arise in 
the region, and the local government has been able to relocate over a hundred individuals so far, 
yet nearly 154,000 homes were flooded by Hurricane Harvey.39 For these reasons, we must turn 
towards the NIFP and FEMA because they played a much larger role in the reconstruction of 
Houston.   
NIFP and FEMA  
 
 
 First and foremost, there is a sharp contrast between the aid provided by NIFP versus 
FEMA. Flood insurance through NIFP is a reliable, and preventative, resource to fall back on 
when things go awry where FEMA provides immediate aid to those in desperate need of it. In 
fact, following Hurricane Harvey, FEMA announced that it wanted to double the amount of 
insured structures in the U.S. by advertising insurance policies in high-risk flood zones. By 
insuring the most at-risk communities, FEMA can maximize its very limited resources for those 
who truly need it (i.e. people who cannot afford flood insurance). Furthermore, it benefits 
                                                     
39 Despart, Zach. "Flood Insurance Paid Homeowners $100,000 More than FEMA... 
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homeowners to purchase flood insurance from NIFP because it amounts to, on average, $100,000 
more than FEMA is able to provide to any given individual.40 To become insured, individuals 
pay a monthly premium to NIFP like they would to any other insurance company, and this 
monthly payment amounts to around $500 a year (this value can rise to more than $2,000 for 
homes in floodplains).41 Right away, class division dictate who will be able to rebuild and who 
will have to take their chances with the couple thousand dollars FEMA is able to provide. Recall 
from the previous chapter that the poorest neighborhoods in Houston were also among the 
closest to floodplains. How can they be expected to pay for flood insurance?  
Though low-income groups may be unable to afford flood insurance, a majority of the 
individuals that live in floodplains and that can afford flood insurance still lack insurance. 
Consequently, over 80% of the affected homes in Houston were not insured. This reality rises 
primarily because insurance policies are a luxury that many cannot afford, but also because 
FEMA and the federal government have misinformed people of the nature of floods in a unique 
city like Houston.42 Still, NIFP has its own issues since it has gone over $25 billion in debt ($5 
billion short of their limit) following Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy, so even this source of aid is 
gradually shrinking.43 
 Blaming individual homeowners for not investing in flood insurance is a fruitless 
endeavor because a) insurance policies can amount to over $2,000 a year and b) FEMA and the 
                                                     
40 Lozano, Juan A., and Meghan Hoyer. "Flood Insurance Uptake Rates Rise in Texas Following Harvey." Insurance 
Journal. July 31, 2018. Accessed November 15, 2018. 
https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/southcentral/2018/07/31/496541.htm. 
41 Long, Heather. "Where Harvey Is Hitting Hardest, 80 Percent Lack Flood Insurance." The Washington Post. 
August 29, 2017. Accessed November 15, 2018. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/08/29/where-harvey-is-hitting-hardest-four-out-of-five-
homeowners-lack-flood-insurance/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.a9b23203738b. 
42 Despart, Zach. "Flood Insurance Paid Homeowners $100,000…” 
43 Long, Heather. "Where Harvey Is Hitting Hardest…” 
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federal government have repeatedly failed to accurately classify flood risk zones throughout the 
Greater Houston area, which has thwarted wealthier homeowners from confidently investing in 
flood insurance. Essentially, the federal government, and to some extent local and state officials, 
have neglected conducting meaningful research around the quickly developing city landscape 
and its effects on existing watersheds and floodplains. This is especially evident in the treatment 
of federally-backed housing units in high-risk flood zones because they are required by law to 
have an active flood insurance policy, yet many were not actually insured.44 Locations deemed 
“Special Flood Hazard Areas” (SFHAs) by FEMA are required to have flood insurance, but 
these SFHAs became virtually indiscriminate once a majority of the city was underwater. 
Evidently, the politics surrounding financial aid during disasters is complex, but this scenario 
serves as a reminder of just how inherently unequal government institutions can be.   
Homelessness by the Numbers  
 
 
 When disaster strikes, there seems to be an air of heroism in the city, which translates 
into individuals offering their own resources to help people out of dangerous situations (Figure 
7). Images of burly men carrying frail seniors out of their flooded homes became commonplace 
on TV and newspapers. Furthermore, people tried to help each other in any way that they could, 
and this was especially apparent on social media. During Hurricane Harvey, the mornings 
following a heavy rainfall would be flooded with pleas for help locating friends and loved ones. 
                                                     
44 Lowry, Michael, Rhome, Jamie and Berg, Robbie. "Why Some of the Nation's Top Hurricane Experts Bought Flood 
Insurance." Inside the Eye. May 09, 2018. Accessed November 15, 2018. 
https://noaanhc.wordpress.com/2018/05/09/why-some-of-the-nations-top-hurricane-experts-bought-flood-
insurance/#_ftn1. 
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Images of individuals that had gone missing during the night would dominate my Facebook feed. 
A sense of urgency always lingered in the air, and we all desperately wanted to help.  
 
FIGURE 7. AN EXAMPLE OF THE WATER RESCUES THAT WERE ONGOING DURING HARVEY IN HOUSTON ON 27 AUGUST 2017 / DAVID J 
PHILLIPS (ASSOCIATED PRESS) 
 
Though this horrific event did bring out the good in people, it cannot go unnoticed that 
our government left us to fend for ourselves. Aid did end up arriving, but why were families like 
mine left without access to food for days at a time? Why have some families returned home but 
other are still forced to live in shelters and underpasses? Why are citizens expected to carry the 
slack for the government, which should be maintaining and consolidating infrastructure? In this 
section, I aim to uncover just how bad the homeless situation has gotten in Houston a little over a 
year after Harvey made landfall in August 2017.  
The Coalition for the Homeless has played a pivotal role in tracking homelessness across 
several counties in the region with a particular focus on those that became homeless because of 
Hurricane Harvey. As defined by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), 
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an individual is considered homeless if they are “staying in an emergency shelter, transitional 
housing, a safe haven with beds specifically for homeless persons” or living on the street 
unsheltered. Using this definition, the Coalition for the Homeless concluded that Houston’s 
Harris County had 91% of the total number of recorded homeless people in the region. 
Furthermore, the region, predominantly Harris County, experienced an increase in homeless 
populations from 3,412 to 3,866 with a majority of the increase being attributed to a spike in 
unsheltered individuals (1,084 unsheltered in 2017 to 1,540 unsheltered in 2018). Of the 3,866 
homeless people recorded in this survey, 18 percent of them claimed to have become homeless 
because of Hurricane Harvey.45 This is approximately 696 of the 3,866 people recorded, and of 
these 696 displaced individuals, 456 are entirely unsheltered meaning that over 65 percent of the 
individuals that lost their homes to Harvey were unable to secure shelter or enough aid to return 
home. This comes as no surprise since FEMA ended up accommodating over 42,000 people in 
temporary shelters. Furthermore, in a period of just 30 days, approximately 270,916 households 
were granted $571.8 million in FEMA aid (about $2,000 per household) for temporary housing, 
basic repairs, and other essential needs.46 Temporary housing was provided after Harvey for a 
maximum period of one month, and repairs were expected to average upwards of $15,000 per 
household. In a city where the median price of a home is $289,950, $2,000 could either shelter 
and feed a family for a few months or be used to partially clean up a flooded home.  
                                                     
45 The Coalition for the Homeless, “Local Data and Research | Coalition,” 
46 FEMA, “Historic Disaster Response to Hurricane Harvey in Texas.” 
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FIGURE 8. DATA COLLECTED IN HARRIS, FORT BEND, AND MONTGOMERY COUNTIES SHOW AN INCREASE IN HOMELESS INDIVIDUALS FROM 
2017 TO 2018/ THE COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS 
 
Clearly, the institutions put in place to aid during times of extreme emergencies are 
lacking in direction, capacity, and efficiency, but there is also something to be said about the lack 
of affordable (and fortified) housing in Houston. Low-income groups, who now make up a 
majority of the unsheltered homeless individuals, cannot be expected to reenter the housing 
market when an increase of 4.1 percent has been observed in the average rent for single-family 
homes and an increase of 2.2 percent has been observed for the average rent for townhomes and 
condominiums following Hurricane Harvey.47 Low-income groups would most likely avoid both 
single-family homes and townhomes anyway since they still cost about $1,500 per month. The 
main problem now lies with the fact that Houston has an average of 18 homes available for every 
100 extremely low-income renter households. This means that if every available low-income 
house in the region were rented out to the current population of homeless people in Houston, 
                                                     
47 Solis, Ali “Houston Post-Harvey Is Ground-Zero for the Rental Affordability Crisis [Opinion] - 
HoustonChronicle.Com,” May 15, 2018, https://www.houstonchronicle.com/opinion/outlook/article/Houston-
post-Harvey-is-ground-zero-for-the-rental-12914050.php. 
Sh 
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there would still be over 3,100 people living in shelters and on the streets. This is clearly a 
problem.  
Hurricane Harvey exacerbated the homelessness problem that Houston already had 
before the storm, but this sudden rise in homelessness has made several things abundantly clear. 
First, Houston’s long history of unregulated sprawl has led to a general disregard for the state of 
the environment and the effects of urbanization on biotic and abiotic factors. Second, 
underfunded federal institutions and agencies have demonstrated that they are not fully capable 
of supporting a city the size of Houston during and after a disaster. Third, low-income 
communities with affordable housing tend to be closest to floodplains while still having the least 
structural fortification to withstand flooding events. Combined, these three points underscore the 
main argument of this thesis: that low-income communities have been systematically forced to 
endure disproportionately more environmental problems compared to their wealthy and white 
counterparts. Having discussed the faults of our federal and local governments during and 
directly after Harvey, the problematic history of Houston development under Jim Crow laws, and 
the role of humans in propagating stronger and stronger hurricanes via climate change, I will 
now explore the future of the Texas Gulf Coast, for these next few years are vital for the future 
of the region and its people.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 “A man should never be ashamed to own he has been in the wrong, 
which is but saying that he is wiser today than he was yesterday.” 
-Alexander Pope on the value of Learning 
Looking Forward  
  
Countless hurricanes have ravaged Texas’s Gulf Coast, and, every single event has had a 
lasting impact on at least a proportion of the population. Still, government institutions at the 
local, state, and federal level have neglected the safety of large metropolitan cities like Houston 
for the sake of growth and development. Rather than investing in flood and hurricane research, 
the federal government has recently enacted budget cuts for such government agencies as the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Federal Emergency Response Agency 
(FEMA), which are solely dedicated to the management, conservation, and preservation of 
nationwide environments, including the task of protecting and aiding communities during natural 
disasters.48 Budget cuts and mismanagement have become apparent in how the federal 
government is responding to the needs of the city and its inhabitants.  
Prior to Hurricane Harvey and to some extent even after, Houstonians have had a limited 
understanding of the environment directly around them. Having attended public school in Texas 
for the entirety of my childhood, matters of pollution and environmental degradation were not 
discussed, and when they were, the topics rarely covered ecosystems in Texas. The general 
patchiness in my understanding of the natural world became that much more evident after I 
                                                     
48 Environmental Protection Agency, "EPA's Budget and Spending." EPA. July 09, 2018. Accessed November 13, 
2018. https://www.epa.gov/planandbudget/budget. 
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began my pursuit of an undergraduate degree in Environmental Analysis. As Melosi and Pratt 
point out in their book, Energy Metropolis, up until very recently, most members of society, 
whether rich or poor, white or minority groups, have admired the opportunities and the 
unfettered growth that Houston has provided them and their families under the heavily polluting 
industries of oil and natural gas.49 In fact, these industries have created over two dozen 
Superfund sites across the Gulf Coast region.50 Eight of these heavily contaminated sites lie in 
the center of Houston, within the circumference of Interstate 610. It would not be until the 
summer of 2018 that I myself would discover these hidden truths about my hometown.  
During the summer of 2018, I became a member of Texas Campaign for the Environment 
(TCE), a non-profit organization that campaigns year-round in Houston and Dallas with hopes of 
mobilizing constituents to reach out to their representatives to tackle environmental problems. 
The 2018 TCE campaign aimed to get more Superfund sites cleaned up following a successful 
2017 campaign that convinced former EPA administrator Scott Pruitt to cleanup the San Jacinto 
Tar Pits. What at first seemed like a huge victory quickly diminished since Texas’s lax 
environmental regulations meant that the area would be considered clean even when toxins and 
contaminants remained present at the site. Still, the passionate work that environmental groups, 
like TCE perform for their communities is invaluable, and the fear that Hurricane Harvey 
brought to Texas has surely helped in propelling community members towards change at the 
local and state level. In fact, pressure at the local and state level has compelled public and private 
research universities, like the University of Houston, Rice University, and even distant schools in 
                                                     
49 Melosi & Pratt. Energy Metropolis. 9.  
50 In collaboration with the U.S. EPA, the Superfund Program was founded in 1980 with the purpose of funding the 
cleanup of sites contaminated with hazardous substances or pollutants. Usually, contaminated sites must reach a 
predetermined level of pollution before being deemed a Superfund site, and after it becomes a Superfund site, 
millions of dollars go towards funding the research and subsequent cleanup of a site.  
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North Texas and Louisiana, to develop plans for how to protect the city against hurricanes and 
floods.51 Sixteen hurricanes of category 3 or higher have made landfall in the Texas Gulf Coast 
since the Galveston Hurricane of 1900, which was the deadliest natural disaster in U.S. history 
with fatalities between 6,000 and 8,000 individuals (Figures 9 & 10).52 Several plans have 
recently been brought forth that aim to curb the effects of hurricanes and flooding on the city of 
Houston. This chapter analyzes and criticized several projects proposed by state and federal 
officials with aims of consolidating the City of Houston and the Texas Gulf Coast.  
 
FIGURE 9. THIS IMAGE DEPICTS A GROUP OF CHILDREN POSING IN FRONT OF A HOUSE THAT WAS STRIPPED FROM ITS FOUNDATION AND 
SHIFTED BY THE HURRICANE'S WINDS. / LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 
                                                     
51 Fulton, William and Shelton, Kyle. "One Year Later: What We've Learned Since Harvey." The Kinder Institute for 
Urban Research. Accessed November 13, 2018. https://kinder.rice.edu/2018/08/19/one-year-later-what-weve-
learned-harvey. 
52 Burnett, John. "The Tempest at Galveston: 'We Knew There Was A Storm Coming, But We Had No Idea'." NPR. 
November 30, 2017. Accessed November 13, 2018. https://www.npr.org/2017/11/30/566950355/the-tempest-at-
galveston-we-knew-there-was-a-storm-coming-but-we-had-no-idea. 
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FIGURE 10. THIS IMAGE SHOWS THE DEVASTATION CAUSED BY THE GALVESTON HURRICANE OF 1900. THE LANDSCAPE IS COMPLETELY 
DROWNED BY TUMBLED STRUCTURES AND HOMES. / LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 
  
The ongoing research conducted by Rice University has been focusing on the cooperation 
between local communities and government officials in planning flood mitigation strategies. The 
rationale here lies in that local community members are better versed in their own communities, 
so their opinions and experiences should carry weight in these discussions. Rice University has 
tackled this issue using a mixture of scientific research as well as a nuanced understanding of 
policies and traditional knowledge of the environment. Students at Rice identified several key 
points for the successful and efficient implementation of natural disaster mitigation strategies in 
Houston. First and foremost, data surrounding the geography of the Gulf Coast, including 
floodplains and active watersheds, as well as the locations that run the highest risk of flooding 
should be actively and reliably collected as well as effectively and accessibly presented to the 
general public. Along these lines, local and outside expertise should be employed to increase the 
effectiveness of local action as well as to determine the most vulnerable populations and how to 
 
 
40 
 
best aid them before, during, and after a natural disaster. Finally, the researchers at Rice 
recognize the limitations associated with aid and research at the federal level--i.e. budget cuts, 
biases, ulterior motives, etc., so they suggest coming up with innovative ways to pay the 
individuals involved in these large-scale projects before finally planning and executing them. 
This study provided a general overview from which to draw inspiration for future planning. The 
authors inform us that the Harris County Flood Control District has been cooperating with 
researchers across Texas, university researchers, city officials, and Harris County constituents.53 
The passionate work and cooperation between these groups are what made the following 
proposals possible.  
 Immediately following Hurricane Harvey, several Houston area groups collaborated and 
drafted some preliminary demands based on the city’s needs. Over the course of two months, the 
U.S. House of Representatives would pass several Hurricane Harvey relief packages.54 Congress 
would end up allocating over $50 billion in Harvey relief by the end of 2017. Though 
considerate, most of this funding would end up going towards FEMA relief efforts rather than 
future mitigation efforts.  
 A sense of urgency has lingered following Harvey as Houstonians wonder how the city is 
going to move forward. Fortunately, diverse groups have banded together with the goal of 
drafting robust and logical projects aimed at mitigating the effects of future hurricanes on the 
region. The varying backgrounds and experiences of these individuals has naturally led to 
diverse project proposals with different goals, but some key themes are reiterated in these 
proposals. In this section I will describe some notable project proposals as well as their 
                                                     
53 Fulton and Shelton. One Year Later. 
54 Arrajj, Shawn. "Houston Area Groups Propose Plan for How Third Hurricane Harvey Relief Package Should Be 
Distributed." Community Impact Newspaper. November 16, 2017. Accessed November 14, 2018.  
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shortcomings. This will be done by looking at the project proposals in chronological order 
following Harvey.   
Rebuild Texas and a Comprehensive Flood Protection Plan for a Better Houston  
  
As I mentioned before, congress has allocated funds towards the Texas Gulf Coast 
following Hurricane Harvey, but most of this money went towards FEMA relief efforts and to 
paying off “debts accumulated by the National Flood Insurance Program.” In an effort to place 
more emphasis on rebuilding and consolidating existing bodies of water, Governor Greg Abbot 
proposed the Rebuild Texas plan, which is composed of several different projects totaling $61.8 
billion in additional funding. Gov. Abbot’s projects place an emphasis on consolidating Addicks 
and Barker Reservoirs, which only keep Greater Houston from experiencing catastrophic floods 
from the upper-west side, but this project has been heavily criticized for neglecting the safety of 
the rest of Harris County. Nonetheless, Gov. Abbot adopts a well-rounded approach to his 
project proposal and accepts the help of more educated individuals to avoid mistakes.55 
The Rebuild Texas plan aims to rebuild the Gulf Coast by following three main steps. 
First, to facilitate and expedite the general rebuilding of any and all affected areas, “assistance 
[centers]” with experts on “federal and state law, federal disaster rules, state rules, government 
procurement, and large-scale construction issues” will guide local officials as well as community 
members when tackling preliminary issues. Second, assistance centers will serve as continuous 
links between the affected communities, state officials, and federal programs. Finally, each group 
and region will report back to the Governor so that he can ensure consistent rebuilding efforts 
across the region. The Rebuild Texas plan ultimately calls for a timely response to local needs 
                                                     
55 Arrajj, Shawn. "Houston Area Groups Propose Plan…” 
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based on individual assessments, and the plan relies on the assumption that communities should 
be built better and stronger than before.56  
Apart from the fortification of communities based on local needs, which makes up a large 
part of Rebuild Texas, Abbot’s plan also places an emphasis on the consolidation of existing 
reservoirs and the construction of a third reservoir in the Cypress Creek watershed. This 
additional reservoir would presumably take pressure off the Addicks and Barker Reservoirs 
during floods. Though a pivotal step in keeping west Houston dry, this portion of Abbot’s plan 
has been criticized for not taking into consideration issues like water flow and speed when 
talking about flooding trends. A strong supporter of Governor Abbot’s plan has been the 
president of the West Houston Association, Augustus Campbell.57 Rather than going against the 
governor’s plan, Campbell has been fighting for the expansion of Rebuild Texas to what he calls 
A Comprehensive Flood Protection Plan for a Better Houston (CFPPBH). Both plans call for the 
immediate research and development of existing reservoirs as well as the construction of a third, 
new reservoir in Cypress Creek. Both plans also place an emphasis on home buyouts to remove 
people from harms way as well as to empty out spaces to develop and build as needed.  
CFPPBH mainly differs in that it also demands the upkeep of existing bayou conveyance 
projects. Campbell claims that flooding events in Houston have become commonplace because 
of slow conveyance across bodies of water. By facilitating the flow of water out of bayous, 
Campbell argues that approximately 12 inches of rainfall can be expelled from the Greater 
Houston area in less than 24 hours. Campbell cites the Sims Bayou project as justification for 
increasing bayou conveyance since the 2015 project essentially kept all the homes along the 
                                                     
56 Abbot, Greg. "Plan." Rebuild Texas. September 7, 2017. Accessed November 14, 2018. 
https://www.rebuildtexas.today/plan/. 
57 The West Houston Association is a non-profit organization that plans and develops infrastructure and public 
policies for the Greater West Houston area.  
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Sims Bayou from flooding during Harvey.58 An overview of Campbell’s Comprehensive Flood 
Protection Plan for a Better Houston, which encapsulates many of the projects proposed in 
Rebuild Texas, is shown in figure 11. The graphic summarizes the points made above while also 
providing a break down of costs and expenditures. Though broad in scope, these two plans are 
similar in that they utilize local knowledge and infrastructure to maximize the aid that 
communities receive.  
Initially, many of these proposals may have seemed overly ambitious since hundreds of 
millions of dollars are expected to go into each project, but Hurricane Harvey clearly had a deep-
rooted effect on the not-so-environmentally friendly state of Texas because suddenly, money was 
no longer a concern. Almost a year after Hurricane Harvey made landfall, an overwhelming 80 
percent of voters in Harris County approved the $2.5 billion Harris County Proposition A flood 
bond, which would raise taxes enough to pay for either Governor Abbot or Augustus Campbell’s 
plan.59 These projects have the unwavering support of citizens, policy-makers, government 
officials, and scientists alike, but how much longer will we keep waiting on the slow-moving 
hand of the federal government? I say this primarily because citizens and local officials have 
demonstrated an eagerness to move forward with these projects while the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers seem to only be getting in the way. 
                                                     
58 Arrajj, Shawn. "Houston Area Groups Propose Plan…” 
59 Despart, Zach. "Harris County Voters Pass $2.5 Billion Flood Bond." Houston Chronicle. August 26, 2018. 
Accessed November 14, 2018. https://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Harris-County-
voters-pass-2-5-billion-flood-bond-13182853.php. 
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FIGURE 11. THIS GRAPHIC ILLUSTRATES THE COMPREHENSIVE FLOOD PROTECTION PLAN FOR A BETTER HOUSTON PROPOSED BY CAMPBELL. 
THE AREAS MARKED A, B, C, AND D REPRESENT RESEVOIRS THAT REQUIRE $3 BILLION IN FUNDING TO RESTORE. THE LIGHT-BLUE BOX 
REPRESENTS A LOCATION THAT SHOULD BE STRATETIGALLY BOUGHTOUT FOR $8.5 BILLION. THE RED LINES THROUGHOUT THE GRAPHIC 
REPRESENT MAJOR BAYOUS THAT SHOULD BE WORKED ON TO IMPROVE CONVEYANCE FOR $20 BILLION. THE PURPLE CIRCLE IN THE TOP 
LEFT REPRESENTS THE LITTLE CYPRESS RESEVOIR, WHICH WOULD REQUIRE $0.3 BILLION TO BUILD.  / WEST HOUSTON ASSOCIATION 
 
The “Ike Dyke” Proposal   
 
The U.S. Army Corp of Engineers (USACE) is a U.S. federal agency under the 
Department of Defense that tackles engineering projects in a wide range of public works, such as 
dam, canal and flood management. USACE has previously come under fire for neglecting 
environmental degradation and privileging economic and political agendas when making 
decisions (i.e. most recently the Dakota Access pipeline). Nonetheless, the work performed by 
USACE is integral in shaping, approving, and carrying out projects across the region and across 
the country. Their cooperation is needed if we ever hope to move forward with large-scale 
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infrastructure rehabilitation. Unfortunately, the Gulf Coast is not the only location getting 
pummeled by natural disasters nor is it the only place in need of research and aid. For this 
reason, USACE does not expect to publish a detailed proposal of the “Ike Dyke” project until the 
year 2021, and even then, policy experts expect another 20 to 30 years before the proposal 
becomes a reality. To further complicate the matter, USACE is proposing a project that solely 
aims to limit the intensity of storm surges during hurricanes rather than keeping inland 
communities from experiencing freshwater floods. This shows a clear lack of understanding 
given that all 68 deaths in Texas during Hurricane Harvey were due to local flooding events 
rather than storm surges.60 Still, USACE tackles some of the issues associated with hurricanes at 
the coastal front rather than within the confines of the city. The proposed project, entitled “Ike 
Dyke,” named after the infamous Hurricane Ike, is grand in scale, cost, and resources, but the 
project may indeed serve as a precautionary measure. Even though the project may not become a 
reality any time soon, there is value in analyzing its faults and potential benefits. Perhaps the 
combined efforts of inland and coastal project will prove far more effective than pursuing just 
one of the two. 
  Compared to Rebuild Texas and CFPPBH, state officials and federal officials, under the 
guidance of USACE, proposed 62 miles of “barrier system made up of floodwalls, floodgates 
and seawall improvements” along Galveston Island (Figure 12). Rather than fortifying and 
rebuilding inland reservoirs and floodplains, USACE has mainly focused on keeping the “largest 
coastal petrochemical complex in the country” from harm’s way. The fact that $31 billion is 
needed to complete the “Ike Dyke” project means that the project has also drawn attention and 
criticism from different research groups. Jim Blackburn, an active Rice University professor in 
                                                     
60 Lozano, Juan A. "Officials Offer Plan to Protect Texas from Hurricanes." AP News. October 26, 2018. Accessed 
November 14, 2018. https://www.apnews.com/9dc96e2008bf4b41923c21eae44f30bb. 
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the reconstruction of Houston, has criticized USACE for basing the “Ike Dyke” off of data 
collected during Hurricane Ike, which was a category 4 tropical cyclone that hit the Gulf Coast in 
2008.61 This is a major flaw in the project proposal’s logic because it essentially creates a 
structure that can sustain the effects of a hurricane that is in every way incomparable to a 
hurricane like Harvey. Though any protection from storm surges is beneficial, USACE should 
include the most recent and relevant data to ensure a project that will withstand not one or two 
storms, but the collective force of dozens of powerful hurricanes throughout our lifetimes. 2017 
alone witnessed Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria, which were all stronger than Hurricane 
Ike, so more thought is obviously required if we ever hope to see the “Ike Dyke” project realized 
in a practical manner. As Blackburn stated, “if all of our eggs are in a $30 billion federal 
appropriation, that just sounds too risky to me.”  
                                                     
61 Collier, Kiah. "Army Corps, Texas Officials Propose Sweeping Hurricane Protection Plan." The Texas Tribune. 
October 26, 2018. Accessed November 14, 2018. https://www.texastribune.org/2018/10/26/army-corps-texas-
officials-propose-hurricane-protection-plan-houston/. 
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FIGURE 12. THE U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS HAVE PROPOSED A DIKE (IN RED) RUNNING ALONG THE ISLAND CITY OF GALVESTON WITH 
A FLOOD GATE, MARKED BY GREEN, TO COMBAT STORM SURGES. / TODD WISEMAN 
 
Reiterated throughout this chapter has been the importance of localized efforts in drafting 
plans and proposals for how to rebuild the city. Local efforts, such as citizen mobilization, 
university and college research, non-profit work, and the involvement of local officials, have 
focused on rebuilding and consolidating inland communities because these are the places facing 
the most infrastructure damage, contamination, and loss of life during hurricanes. Furthermore, 
the individuals experiencing these problems first-hand are much more knowledgeable on what 
their immediate needs are. As expected, the USACE prioritizes the protection of the immediate 
coast because the country as a whole depends on the refineries and factories located in this 
region. The allocation of aid and the actual projects that will be implemented depend on the 
funding available and the priorities of the groups providing the resources. At the end of the day, 
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groups are still mobilizing and rallying support well over a year after Hurricane Harvey 
occurred, and who knows how much longer it will take for these projects to finally initiate. There 
are still gaps in our knowledge, but we cannot risk waiting for the next big hurricane to hit before 
we finally act.   
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CONCLUSION 
  
 Hurricane Harvey will forever remain ingrained in my memory. Not because it was the 
most devastating hurricane to ever hit the Texas Gulf Coast but because it pressured an entire 
region to take the threats of climate change and disasters more seriously. A majority of 
Houstonians were once unaffected by floods and storms altogether, but this has quickly changed. 
Floods have become more frequent in Houston in the last two decades as the city has welcomed 
nearly half a million more people. As the city has grown and developed, concrete surfaces have 
altered the region’s watersheds by increasing the amount of rain water that enters floodplains. 
Furthermore, the industrialization of the economy and subsequent deforestation of the coast has 
weakened sand banks and exacerbated the effects of hurricanes. If Houston continues to grow, 
then more dangers are expected to surface as more people are placed in the trajectory of future 
hurricanes.  
 Throughout this thesis, I have laid out several factors that contribute to the overall 
intensity of hurricanes within a region. First, I linked human consumption of nonrenewable 
resources to climate change. This was done to remind the reader of the complex ways that 
humans have interacted with their environments and to show how the environment has in turn 
responded to these interactions. My main purpose in providing a scientific background on 
hurricane formation and hurricane ecology was to convince the reader that humans have played 
an active role in how powerful hurricanes have become under global warming. I described the 
transition of Houston from a plantation-based economy to one heavily reliant on oil to 
contextualize the history of African-American settlement throughout the city. I argue that white 
settlers chose to create suburbs in higher elevations, such as the Houston Heights, Montrose, and 
West University Place, because they were distant and elevated from floodplains. In settling these 
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areas, white settlers ensured that poor and black folk would be unable to afford and inhabit these 
locations, which was evident in the unfair housing practices described in chapter 2. Chapter 2 
framed the discussion of disasters around class and race as it showed that the poorest 
neighborhoods in Houston were located directly on floodplains where the wealthiest 
neighborhoods were located throughout west-central Houston, which is the least affected by 
floodplains. Chapter 3 furthered this discussion by pinpointing the flaws associated with state 
and federal aid following a disaster. Essentially, the aid provided by FEMA after any disaster is 
heavily limited by the sheer number of people that require it. To make matters worse, private 
insurance companies and the National Flood Insurance Program charge premiums that are simply 
out of reach for low-income households, which also have the highest flood risks. Furthermore, I 
condemn Houston’s lack of affordable housing as being one of the main reasons behind the 
sudden spike in homelessness across the city. I conclude by looking towards local, state, and 
federal officials as they draft and propose flood mitigation projects. Through my analysis of 
three separate proposals, I conclude that they each have potential to limit the intensity and 
frequency of flooding, but they still require much more thought before being realized.  
 Ultimately, disasters like Hurricane Harvey are complex phenomena that reverberate 
throughout an entire region. They are inherently complicated, and they increasingly seem to 
behave in ways we have never seen before. This is where its worth noting that the world we live 
in now is not the same world that the generations before us experienced. Environmental 
degradation has only become more and more apparent, and every day, we seem to be nearing a 
definitive crash in our society. If anything, I hope this thesis illuminates the discrepancies 
between those causing environmental degradation and those directly facing it. It may be true that 
climate change is indiscriminate and all-encompassing, but to say that we all suffer equally when 
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disasters strike is false. Only by acknowledging these inequalities can we truly be of service to 
the affected communities. If nothing else, Hurricane Harvey showed us just how unnatural these 
disasters can truly be.  
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